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abstract
This paper discusses the principles of electricity network charging in the light of 
increasing amounts of distributed generation and the potential for significant in-
creases in electric vehicles or distributed electrical energy storage. We outline cost 
reflective pricing, traditional public service pricing, platform market pricing and 
customer- focused business model pricing. We focus on the particular problem 
of how to recover network fixed costs and a recent example from Australia. We 
conclude that there are serious issues for regulators to address, but that potential 
solutions at the distribution level may already exist at the transmission level. 
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f 1. INTRODUCTION g
In any network industry—e.g., communications, transport, electricity, gas, and water—
there is a fundamental issue of how to recover the network fixed costs (or generalized system 
costs) from large numbers of users who put very different demands on the system and who 
have differing willingness to pay. While theory can provide some guidance as to efficient, 
profitable and fair ways to charge for network services—different objectives for charging often 
conflict. For instance, time and space varying charges for network use according to network 
condition might be efficient, but they are very unlikely to be fair towards poor inflexible net-
work users, unable to respond to the signals they send. 
Such conflicts are a problem because network industry regulators primarily exist to deliver 
BOTH average prices AND price structures (arising from charging methodologies which ap-
portion overall costs to different classes of customer) which are socially acceptable at any given 
time as well as through time. Society often tolerates ‘unfair’ average prices and price structures 
when industries deliver higher quality services or generally falling prices (as might be the case 
in many communications markets at present). Where industry dynamism is low, unfair price 
structures without a clear rationale are unlikely to persist for long in heavily regulated indus-
tries. Where particular charging methodologies have developed over long periods that deliver 
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(or are perceived to deliver) reasonably fair outcomes, these may come under pressure to be 
changed if they cease to deliver as previously.
This paper explores the network charging principles for the electricity distribution net-
work in the light of actual and potential significant changes in the share of rooftop solar PV, 
electric vehicles and distributed electricity storage (so-called, distributed energy resources or 
DERs). These technologies, combined with smart metering which allows 2-way communica-
tion between the system and individual users about supply and demand in near real time, may 
put existing charging methodologies under extreme pressure. 
A distribution network delivers transportation capacity. It is sized for peak system use, and 
there are some costs (e.g., for voltage support, frequency regulation, congestion-related energy 
losses) which vary in time and by location. Such capacity ensures that kWhs of energy and 
peak KW power can be delivered to customers at adequate power quality (e.g., within given 
frequency and voltage bounds). As a basic starting position, perhaps 80%+% of distribution 
network costs—if we attribute energy losses to retailers—are fixed in the medium-run for 
a given set of connections. In addition, DERs can offer flexibility (or reduced inflexibility) 
to the system in the presence of a general rise is intermittent, low inertia, generators.1 Such 
flexibility services might include ancillary services to support renewable generation, or the re-
duction/increase of local demand to help match supply and demand in conditions on network 
congestion. Flexibility reduces the requirement for conventional network investments in core 
network assets such as lines and transformers.
Electricity network charges can be charged on both generation and demand and can be a 
combination of maximum rated capacity fixed charges, peak system injection/withdrawal and 
kWh usage. At the transmission level, network charges can be recovered on the basis of a com-
bination of all three of these charges and payments by users of the transmission network (no-
tably, retailers) can reflect time of use and locational elements. However, in most jurisdictions, 
smaller commercial and almost all residential users have traditionally faced a combination of 
demand based charges for distribution which include a small fixed element (typically 20% or 
less of total network charges)2 plus per kWh usage (80% or more at average consumption). 
These charges have not varied by time or location within a given distribution network. 
The rise of DERs means that the currently unsophisticated charging methodologies for 
distribution are being reconsidered as they may no longer be fit for purpose. The solution 
might be to consider extending pricing methodologies which exist at the transmission network 
level to the distribution level (such as system peak MW based usage charges or fixed per MW 
capacity connection charges), as distribution networks increasingly behave like transmission 
networks. However, even this is not an obvious solution, as transmission network pricing 
methodologies also vary substantially in their sophistication across the world.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss four different sets of network 
charging principles, in the quest for theoretical guidance on network charging methodologies. 
Section 3, outlines the nature of problems posed for current charging methodologies by the 
actual and potential development of DERs in distribution networks. Section 4 then consid-
ers the nature of potential solutions to these problems and how regulators should approach 
evaluation of the need for changing current charging methodologies. Section 5 offers some 
conclusions.
1. See Strbac et al. (2016).
2. European Commission (2015, p. 114).
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f 2. FOUR DIFFERENT SETS OF NETWORK CHARGING PRINCIPLES g
In this section, we outline, compare and attempt to synthesize four different charging 
principles. Each represents a particular way of thinking about how to charge for network ser-
vices in a world characterized by the need to price flexibility services in such a way as to deliver 
the electricity services that customers actually want, subject to high-level policy objectives on 
decarbonization, renewables and demand reduction. Different objectives on decarbonization, 
renewables and demand reduction can be incentivized directly, but clearly, the distribution 
pricing methodology may of itself influence them via their impact on the marginal price of 
using a kWh.
The four basic principles are: cost reflective charging, traditional public service pricing, 
platform market pricing and customer focused business model pricing. The first two have his-
torically been closely associated with each other; similarly, there is a close relationship between 
the modern theory of platform market pricing and customer focussed business model pricing.
2.1 Cost reflective pricing
Cost reflective pricing recognizes that electricity network costs vary by time, location and 
power quality. In theory, network charges should reflect the cost of delivering of import and 
export capacity to network users. The cost of this capacity should vary by time of day, location 
and quality and by the amount of capacity itself (and whether it is export or import). For large 
energy users and large generators connected to the transmission system this is significantly 
the case already. Indeed, in many organized markets in the US, transmission system, users are 
exposed to locational marginal prices for power (reflecting short run congestion costs).3 By 
contrast, Great Britain transmission system users are exposed to zonal long-run marginal net-
work expansion costs via zonal varying per MW connection charges. In the past actual network 
prices paid have not varied much by time of day, location or quality for most network users, 
significantly because of a lack of half-hourly metering. Yet, retailers have explicitly offered a 
large degree of averaging and wholesale price risk insurance to most final customers. However, 
as we noted above DERs (such as distributed storage) can respond to short and longer run 
price signals that more cost-reflective charging would send, because of the presence of smart 
equipment which can respond to real-time signals. This is especially important with respect to 
flexibility services, which have traditionally been bundled up with the monopoly distribution 
service, but could be made competitive (e.g., voltage support in the distribution network).4
A fundamental issue in cost-reflectivity is whether some of the traditional differences in 
the basis of network charging—e.g., for low/high voltage distribution level connected genera-
tion vs. transmission level connected generation—are fit for purpose given the direct compe-
tition between the services provided by these types of network user. For instance, transmission 
connected generators in Great Britain are required to pay a per MWh balancing services use 
of system charge (BSUoS), which is not paid for by distributed generation (DG), while there 
is no volume related export charge for micro-generators (such as household PV) connected at 
the distribution level.
Cost reflectivity, as represented by marginal costs, is not enough to ensure recovery of 
full economic costs for a network (see Perez-Arriaga et al. 1995). There remain unallocated 
3. See Bohn et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992, 2018).
4. See discussion of the potentially competitive elements of current distribution service in CEER (2014, especially page 43) 
and in State of New York Department of Public Service (2014, especially page 20).
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fixed costs that can be apportioned in a multiplicity of ways to individual consumers, most 
obviously by putting higher charges on richer consumers (a form of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing)5. 
This has little efficiency impact (for the electricity system) if the reapportionment does not 
affect consumption. Thus it would be possible to apportion the recovery of fixed costs through 
charges by income, property value, kW connection capacity or another indicator of income (or 
ability to pay), which did not result in distortion of the use of electricity.6 Of course in the past 
the easiest proxy for income, available to utilities, has been electricity usage itself and hence 
recovering some fixed costs via kWh charges has been favored (indeed via rising block tariffs in 
developing countries). 7 High fixed charges can be distortionary if they result in disconnections 
from the network (or non-connection in the first place), while high variable charges can distort 
consumption downwards. In the past, the utility of electricity service has been so high (and 
the usage charges so low) that it clearly has not resulted in much disconnection (connection 
rates are close to 100%) or in much moderation of use among high-income consumers (price 
elasticities of demand are low).
2.2 Traditional public service pricing
Traditional public service pricing has sought to reconcile cost reflectivity and fairness8, while 
recognizing that networks often have public goods characteristics, such as the fact that some 
dimensions of power quality are common (e.g., system frequency stability). Regulated indus-
tries, such as electricity, are regulated precisely because of legitimate public interest in both the 
average level of and the distribution of charging between customers. Regulators are also tasked 
with enforcing socially acceptable levels of price discrimination.9 Regulated industries have 
been built up over decades and financed by past customer contributions; the current genera-
tion is paying for/benefiting from past network expenditure. Financial commitments entered 
into previously need to be honored by the current generation of customers. Perhaps 80% (or 
more) of current network financial costs are fixed10 and recovering these costs through network 
charges is a form of taxation. While some operating costs could be reduced if connections 
were to fall or planning standards (related to network resilience) were to be relaxed, they could 
probably not be reduced on less than a five to ten year horizon. In spite of this the overall fixed 
charge has been low for many customers.11
Added to this, some network costs are related to the recovery of government imposed en-
ergy policy schemes, bad debt recovery costs and cover price insurance costs. Regulators have 
5. See Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1971). Ramsey-Boiteux (or, simply, Ramsey pricing) pricing in the presence of higher so-
cial welfare weights on poor customers implies a modified form of the inverse price elasticity rule of fixed cost recovery (i.e. higher 
mark ups for fixed costs on more inelastic customers), which adjusts for the welfare weights. In the past rich electricity customers 
have also been price inelastic so that Ramsey pricing implies that they should pay much more towards the fixed costs than poorer 
customers. However in the future if rich customers with DERs become more price elastic this would imply that they should make 
less of a fixed cost contribution, than would have been optimal before.
6. See Boley and Fowler (1977) for a discussion of the traditional basis for charging in Great Britain.
7. A survey of 16 EU countries showed that 13 recovered more than half of their residential distribution charges via kWh 
related charges. (see European Commission 2015, p.114).
8. This reflects the Bonbright (1961) principles of utility rate making. Bonbright discusses in great detail the difficulties of 
implementing marginal cost based prices in practice—in the context of US utility regulation—in the presence of fixed costs and 
the need to recover them in a way that is socially acceptable. 
9. See Stigler and Friedland (1962).
10. Simshauser (2014) suggests that distribution network costs are 60% sunk, 20% fixed and 20% variable in Australia.
11. See Cluzel and Standen (2013) and Ofgem (2015).
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to approve both the level of prices and the charging methodologies12 by which average price 
or average revenue caps are achieved. Charging very different prices to different households 
or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the same area has not been an acceptable 
form of price discrimination, historically. However, some forms of cost reflectivity have been 
recognized as being important such as time of day pricing for larger users, charging customers 
in different areas differently, cost-reflective connection charges or charging more to custom-
ers connected at higher voltages. Going forward, the public service pricing principle may be 
thought of as giving rise to a form of grandfathered rights of access to the network on a par-
ticular charging basis. Careful thought should, therefore, be given to arbitrary reallocation of 
existing network access rights, via significant changes to the basis of network charges and the 
impact of new users of the network on the existing allocation of payments for network services.
2.3 Platform market pricing
Platform market pricing is about how to price the services provided in a two-sided mar-
ket13. The classic example is the credit card company (e.g., MasterCard or Visa) that provides 
transaction services to retailers and final credit card users. Normally credit card users are given 
the cards for free, while the retailers pay transaction related fees, which they can pass on in 
higher goods prices to the users. MasterCard for example, as the platform provider for their 
global payments system, coordinate both sides of the market and there exist powerful network 
externalities, implying that the utility of users of a platform depends on the number of other 
users—either on the same side or the other side of the platform. ICT and the associated comple-
mentary innovation are essential components of platform markets: this creates added-value that 
increases utility to all user groups. The electricity distribution network operator can be thought 
of as a platform provider, providing services to both final electricity consumers, conventional 
generators and to flexibility providers who own DERs. In the future we can imagine energy 
service companies (ESCOs) placing DER equipment on their customers’ premises for free14, 
paying the network companies and recovering the costs from the customers in higher energy 
service charges. Distribution Network Operators (DNOs), acting as the platform owner, might 
want to encourage this by rebalancing their charges away from households and focusing them 
on ESCOs. The State of New York has explicitly adopted the idea of the distribution utility as 
a distribution system platform provider (or DSP) for the promotion of DERs.15 The platform 
idea should focus consideration of what is the unique service provided by the regulated network 
and what are the services that are sold across the platform between the two sides of the market. 
At a basic level, a transparent and simple platform user charge could serve to promote the use of 
the platform (e.g., by flexibility providers) and more importantly increased overall trading value 
(as in the credit card example), in a way that finely tuned cost reflective pricing may fail to do.
2.4 Customer focussed business model pricing
Customer focussed business model pricing puts customers and what they value at the center 
of charging principles (rather than narrowly focusing on optimality in pricing, which is still 
12. In Great Britain these are the Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM) and EHV Distribution Charging 
Methodology (EDCM).
13. See Weiller and Pollitt (2013).
14. For instance, Richter and Pollitt (2016) find that household electricity customers would expect the ESCO to pay them for 
locating DERs on their premises.
15. See State of New York Department of Public Service (2014), Pollitt and Anaya (2016) and Jones et al. (2016).
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the case with platform market pricing). Business model theory focuses on value proposition, 
value creation, and value capture.16 Customers are willing to pay for something when it sat-
isfies a need for them (i.e., it has a value proposition). A given good or service must involve 
value creation for the customer, by effectively satisfying this need. Finally, there must be some 
way for service providers to monetize these customer benefits (value capture). The key issues 
for DERs are: do they have a value proposition for ultimate customers; what services do they 
actually provide to the system; and how can they be remunerated effectively. There is more 
than one way for a given DER to be remunerated. Gassmann et al. (2014) identify 55 generic 
business models (e.g., pay per use, subscription, revenue sharing, etc.). In modern markets 
(e.g., the platform markets mentioned above) with large numbers of service providers and 
business-to-business (B-to-B) transactions, the allocation of value to individual businesses is 
complex. It is often achieved by exploiting multiple revenue streams. It should be remembered 
that manipulating network charges to send price signals to DERs is only one of several sources 
of cost and benefit for DER investors and it may not be decisive or indeed effective17. It is also 
the case that distribution network operators (DNOs) and transmission companies should also 
be incentivized to innovate uses for their platform and are in a good position to respond to 
potential future uses of their own networks, subject to a requirement not to disadvantage their 
current customers.
2.5 Discussion
These four different approaches to network charge determination all recognize the im-
portance of a degree of cost reflectivity in the charging methodology. However they put very 
different degrees of emphasis on this as a charging principle. This is a separate issue from the 
determination of the overall level of charges (i.e., total regulated revenue) that has to be set 
by the regulator as part of the price control review process / ‘rate’ setting process. Normally 
charging methodologies are simply approved by the regulator and display a high degree of 
inertia over time. These approaches also draw attention to where fixed cost recovery should be 
focused and on the need fair charging and to the promotion of innovation and increased use of 
networks that have public good characteristics and exhibit network externalities.
It is also important to be clear that in the end it is very difficult to avoid the distortion 
created by the difference between consumer and producer prices. This is common to all goods 
in society. Consumer prices include taxes (VAT, recovery levies, fixed costs), producer prices 
do not include these. There is always going to be a ‘tax’ advantage in self-supply. This will tend 
to undermine the ability to recover fixed costs in conditions where end users are allowed to 
make investments in their own distributed energy resources. The question is how serious this 
distortion will become and whether moving the recovery of electricity taxes to other elements 
of electricity service, other than kWhs, will be possible.
Another possibility is to extend the current charging basis to include own-use of DERs 
(such as storage and PV).18 Currently, this is straightforward because much own production at 
the household level commands a subsidy payment and hence must be metered and reported. 
However, as PV prices fall and requirements for registration and metering of all production are 
16. See Teece (2010) and Oseni and Pollitt (2017).
17. See Northern Powergrid (2015).
18. Developments in digital rights management have shown that this is possible in other sectors. We have now developed the 
technology to charge for every view of a page or a TV programme, regardless of whether it occurs using customer owned equip-
ment. This has undermined the ability of owners of copies to trade them free of ‘tax’ (as is the case with books or CDs).
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no longer necessary to receive a subsidy payment, in the future this sort of arrangement may 
raise privacy issues / not be enforceable.
This paper focuses on the charging models for network companies. However final charges 
for electricity service are determined by retail companies, not network owners, these are the 
prices that most customers see and respond to. We should be clear that it is up to retailers as to 
the extent to which they wish to pass through the variations in network charges they incur to 
their retail customers.19 A recent survey found that this was even true for half-hourly metered 
industrial and commercial customers in Great Britain, very few of whom were actually exposed 
to any of the underlying variation in their network charges.20 Thus sharpening underlying 
network pricing signals may not make much difference to what final users do because of the 
limited degree of price pass-through to final retail prices. While regulators can seek to regulate 
the pass-through of charges, this would be to ignore the value that all retail customers, includ-
ing business customers, place on simple to understand pricing structures and value of common 
national or regional prices to retailers.
Some authors (e.g., Biggar and Reeves 2016) have emphasized that underlying network 
charges should reflect all substantial variations in costs—which can be identified externally—
while at the same time being offered with hedging products. However, this is not common 
practice in most markets, where often only substantially hedged products are offered to final 
customers, and ‘basic’ unhedged prices may not even be quoted. This is because the offering 
of sophisticated choices between hedged and unhedged products is expensive. Even poten-
tially sophisticated purchasers of network services have to consider their ability to manage 
underlying input risk and have limited ability to pass on input price fluctuations to their own 
customers. Hence there is a generalized preference throughout the economy for pricing which 
is easy to justify and advertise.
f 3. THE PROBLEM DERS POSE FOR EXISTING DISTRIBUTION g 
CHARGING METHODOLOGIES
Now we consider a case study of how network charging regimes can rapidly become unfit 
for purpose in the presence of a big uptake of particular DERs. 
South Queensland in Australia has one of the highest penetration rates of domestic solar 
PV in the world. 22% of households had PV in 2014 (and 75% have air-conditioning).21 Dis-
tribution charges in South Queensland are charged on the basis of 20% fixed cost and 80% per 
kWh. The massive increase in solar PV (from close to zero at the start of 2009) has resulted in 
a huge transfer of wealth and costs between customer groups. Solar PV consumers have lower 
metered consumption due to own production. This significantly reduces their share of the per 
kWh costs of the distribution system. Meanwhile, the revenue cap regulation of the distribu-
tion charges means that the same revenue has been recovered as the number of units has fallen, 
thus per unit charges have risen and the distribution of their payment between different types 
of households has dramatically changed.
19. A check of available retail offers on one price comparison site for my property on 14 March 2016 revealed that annual 
standing charges for electricity ranged from £61.90 to £100.01.
20. Northern Powergrid (2015, pp.48–50).
21. See Simshauser (2014), for another Australian perspective on the issue of PV uptake see MacGill and Smith (2017) and 
Mountain and Carstairs (2018).
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Simshauser (2014) analyses four types of household in this new situation: households with 
no PV and no air-conditioning (this is the poorest group); households with air-condition-
ing and no PV; households with PV and no air-conditioning; and households with PV and 
air-conditioning. He looks at how the charging mechanism has shifted the payments and con-
siders a more cost reflective charging regime where each household pays a fixed charge, a per 
kW peak charge and a variable per kWh charge which better reflects underlying costs. What 
he finds is that households with PV and air-conditioning have only a fractionally lower peak 
per kW usage relative to those with no PV but air-conditioning. Meanwhile, households with 
air-conditioning and no PV currently pay less than they should towards distribution charges, 
given their relative cost of service. The impact is striking. The poorest group without PV and 
air-conditioning currently pay 307 Australian dollars p.a. more (or c.$23522, i.e., around 40% 
more) than those with PV and no air-conditioning (see Table 1). This reveals that the starting 
point of charging is already unfairly subsidizing peaky users with air-conditioning AND that 
the system has rapidly become much more unfair with the high take-up of PV. A more cost 
reflective three-part tariff schemes sees those with PV and air-conditioning paying 28% more 
than at the moment and those without both paying 15% less (with the result that the poorer 
households pay around 180 AUD ($137) less). Simply put: the relationship between kWhs 
and kW peak observed prior to the arrival of PV has fundamentally changed, such that kWhs 
are a poor proxy for kW peak demand.
The above example from Australia makes a point, but it is extreme, if not unique23. It arises 
from a combination of high underlying network charges, high PV penetration, and high solar 
radiation. In a different jurisdiction, there could be a lot less impact from the same DERs. 
Thus, in the UK underlying electricity distribution network charges average around $130 (or 
1/6 of the level in South Queensland); household PV penetration has reached a maximum of 
around 5% in the sunniest regions (1/4 of Queensland); and typical residential PV output and 
22. 1.31 AUD = $1 as of 3 November 2017. 
23. Jones et al. (2016) also discuss the case of Hawaii, which has very high penetration of domestic PV.
TABLE 1
Differences in Network Charges for Residential Consumers in South Queensland  
(in Australian dollars)
 Household A Household B Household C Household D 
 No air-con Air-con No air-con Air-con 
 No Solar PV No Solar PV Solar PV Solar PV 
Maximum Demand (kW) 1.41 2.14 1.40 2.09 
Metered Import (kWh) 6253.4 7560.6 3820.1 4707.1 
Solar Export (kWh) 0 0 2259.1 1838.8 
Gross Demand (kWh) 6253.4 7560.6 6253.4 7560.6 
Number of Customers 283849 694643 26151 235357 
% of Customers 23% 56% 2% 19% 
    
Base Network Tariff $1006.14 $1171.37 $698.57 $810.69 
Differences A-C B-D  
 $307.57 $360.68  
Source: Simshauser (2014).
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export is 1/2 the Queensland level. This suggests a bill impact of around 1/48 of the Australian 
level, or just a few pounds (and less than 1% of the total bill). This is likely to be common to 
many temperate regions. Indeed, Athawale and Felder (2016) showed that for New Jersey the 
impact in 2014 of net metering was only around $1 per month for the poorest households. 
These observations immediately suggest that some jurisdictions will be under more pressure 
to change their distribution charging methodology than others from certain types of DERs.24 
The so-called utility death spiral25 is currently unlikely in most places26 but may be an issue in 
some, significant, parts of some networks.
Differences between in the basis of charging itself at different voltage levels may distort 
the choice of where to connect DERs.27 The nature of the charging methodology may influ-
ence the choice between storage, generation and load and the nature of integration between 
the three. In principle, it is desirable that the charging methodology and in particular the ‘tax’ 
component of use of system charges should not distort the location and type of investment on 
the network. In practice that might be very difficult to achieve via any given charging meth-
odology.
Related to the above point, one can overemphasize the impact of the existing charging 
methodology at the ‘grid edge’ (see Sioshansi 2017) or the likely significance of a shift in elec-
tricity asset ownership (see Smith and MacGill 2017). If some households do substantially in-
vest in DERs in remote locations and make much less (even zero) contribution to grid costs, it 
is not altogether clear that this necessitates a generalized change in the charging methodology. 
The grid-edge (which is where a lot of small-scale DERs might be located) is already heavily 
subsidized within the existing electricity system where non-location varying tariffs favor re-
mote connections. What matters in the long-run is the cost contributions of a large majority 
of grid-users for whom extreme DER options (such as complete grid-disconnections) are not 
currently a viable option.
Some of the issues raised by DERs would seem to be solved by introducing transmission 
network type charging methodologies in the distribution system. The Queensland problem 
might have been solved by export charges for kWhs or moving to kW peak demand charges. 
This would have largely protected the non-PV households from the negative impact of the 
uptake of PV, while actually being more cost reflective. However, many jurisdictions do not 
charge generators for the use of the grid (no export charges), and there is wide variation in the 
total amount of transmission charges recovered in kW peak demand charges (as opposed to 
kWhs demanded). So, simple extension of current transmission charging methodologies to 
distribution may not be a solution because they are not themselves optimal at the transmission 
level. Hence, while some (e.g., Knieps 2016) have argued for the extension of nodal pricing to 
the distribution level as the solution to the rise of DERs, this argument has not been won at the 
transmission level in many (indeed most) jurisdictions. Transmission charges themselves still 
have to recover fixed costs and nodal pricing does not in of itself solve the fixed cost recovery 
problem illustrated by Queensland.
24. See analysis of drivers of residential solar PV uptake across the US in Kwan (2012).
25. See Sioshansi (2016, xxxi ff.) and Athawale and Felder (2016).
26. See Gellings (2016) on why the current charging models are still fit for purpose.
27. For instance, the nature of DUoS charges for DG connected to the extra high voltage distribution network (under the 
EDCM) vs DUoS charges for DG connected at lower voltages (under the CDCM) is different in GB and may distort the decision 
of which voltage to connect at.
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A more fundamental problem is the fact that changing the charging basis may only really 
allow core network costs to become more optimal in the long run (often very long run) as the 
network is optimally reconfigured over time. Many networks in developed countries are over-
sized for current demands, and hence the scope for actually reducing costs in the medium run 
is limited, and the economic benefits of reduced network use are small. The longtime horizon 
for network cost reductions is a problem for DER investments which need to see price signals 
in the much shorter run (due to their higher discount rates and shorter time horizons) than 
the 40–70 years which it may take to reduce the need for conventional network investment.
DERs which impact network costs can easily be over-rewarded for any network cost re-
ductions. One reason for this is because small discrete contributions to the provision of net-
work services should properly value their failure to deliver risk. Conventional networks may 
have 99.99% (one hour per year of lost load) or more availability28, whereas individual asset 
availability may struggle to reach 98% availability. Thus, a household that is rewarded for the 
presence of a distributed storage device which reduces its average peak consumption, but where 
the device does not deliver on some days of the year, is over-rewarded. The risk is that DERs 
paid to provide network services (to facilitate network capacity or quality) in an uncoordinated 
way will be collectively more expensive (and/or more risky) than conventional coordinated 
distribution company provided solutions, i.e., systemic failure to deliver risk from DERs will 
not be priced properly.
Regulators could also be faced with a stranded asset problem in conventional distribution 
network solutions. DERs might mean that substantial or discrete parts of the existing network 
could be written off / written down in value. The question is how and when to do this? This 
has been done before when liberalization gave rise to the accelerated depreciation of generation 
assets forced to close early and competitive transition charges to pay for generation asset write-
downs. One could argue that the regulated equity risk premium enjoyed by distribution assets 
incorporates some probability of a substantial asset writes down at some date. Even a very low 
2% equity risk premium suggests equity will be written off every 50 years!
How retailers expose final customers to any changes in the distribution charging meth-
odology remains to be seen. This means that while regulators may seek to change the basis 
of regulated distribution charges, they may not ultimately have much impact on the realized 
charges to which poorer households unable to respond to DER incentives are exposed unless 
they are prepared to extend regulation of retail tariffs.
f 4. SOLUTIONS TO THE IMPACT OF DERS ON THE DISTRIBUTION g 
CHARGING METHODOLOGY
When looking for solutions to the problems posed by the widespread uptake DERs on the 
existing charging methodology, there are a number of issues to be considered which are worth 
emphasizing. 
To begin with, the mix of fixed KW capacity, kW peak use, kWhs exported/imported is 
not obvious. While we have seen a lot of concern in some jurisdictions about the uptake of 
PV in the context of kWh based network charging, a similar uptake of electric vehicles might 
have the opposite effect. Widespread uptake of electric vehicles, principally charged at home, 
28. In Great Britain all the distribution networks have less than 60 minutes per year of interruption. See https://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/data-portal/customer-interruptions-and-minutes-lost-electricity-distribution-riio-ed1 (Accessed 3rd November 2017).
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would increase the contribution of rich households to total network costs. Similarly, a switch 
to electric heating, using air source heat pumps, would also potentially reduce current elec-
tricity charges for users who do not install them. Fixed kW capacity based charging may be 
cost-reflective, but it will unwind the conventional quantity based discounts enjoyed by low 
users (particularly single person elderly households).
Outturn political acceptability of network charging methodology remains important for 
economic regulators. A point worth bearing in mind is that the cost to the consumer of the 
network reducing the reliability of electricity supply from its current level of 99.99% to 98% 
(self-supply) is very high. For the UK, loss of 2% of 3.2 MWh—average annual household 
electricity consumption—at a value of a lost load of £10,000 per MWh29 on a willingness to 
accept basis, implies the need for a compensation of £640 to give up current levels of reliability. 
This suggests that the underlying economics of any reduction in network reliability from its 
current level contingent on the value of DERs is challenging. In addition to this, Green and 
Staffell (1917) show that it remains highly unlikely that domestic storage will be cheap enough 
to make disconnection an economically viable option for most household consumers in the 
UK, even by 2030. 
Some charging solutions can be adopted in an evolutionary fashion as issues and oppor-
tunities arise. The desire to increase or reduce demand in parts of the network at certain times 
in order to minimize system costs does not require all users to be exposed to time and space 
varying network charges. It only requires the existence of markets for flexibility or regulatory 
requirements to sign DER flexibility contracts (as a form of ancillary services). Thus, what-
ever the basis for published (‘posted’) network charges is, what matters is whether efficient 
deviations from those prices can be offered to DERs and other providers of flexibility to the 
network. Such discounts to posted prices can be selectively offered to flexibility providers who 
actually deliver services that are contractually useful to the network rather than incorporated 
into the posted prices directly.
New devices offer opportunities for new charging bases related to those devices. Thus, 
domestic PV export, fast EV charging and distributed ancillary services provision offer new 
opportunities for the introduction of cost-reflective charging related to the new uses of the 
network. Just as developments in telecommunications technology have seen reduced time and 
space differentiation of conventional voice telephony, they have also seen a proliferation of 
charges for new products (e.g., texts, different speeds of broadband access, etc.). New products 
are opportunities for recovering a share of network fixed costs from new uses of the network.
It is worth reiterating a general point, that cross-subsidies from the network charges to 
other parts of the electricity value chain should be avoided or at the very least made explicit. It 
is clearly wrong to use network charges to collect or deliver subsidies to solar when customers 
are increasingly able to respond, in ways that are both inefficient and unfair, to the miss-incen-
tives that are thus created. While PV penetration was low, this might not be a big issue in some 
jurisdictions, but it has clearly the potential to be become significantly distortionary. As a fol-
low-up to the Queensland case, the Australian national regulator (AEMC) has now published a 
rule (November 2014) that there should be a presumption that DERs should be connected but 
that ‘network charges should be cost-reflective for all network users’. It has introduced a ‘tariff 
structure statement’ for networks which should explain how a given networks’ charges comply 
with the objective. There has also been a move towards legal separation of DNSP (distribution 
29. See London Economics (2013, p.31).
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network service provider) and attempt to make non-monopoly services of DNSP contestable. 
Both the regulator and the industry have consulted on future developments.30
Given that DERs can make a case for being compensated to the value of the best alter-
native solution it is not clear that the ultimate consumers will see any expected benefit (just 
increased cost risk) unless there is a net benefit test, i.e., DERs should pay a system fixed cost 
contribution out of any savings that they generate to compensate the other contributors to 
the system for their underwriting of their costs. This should be in addition to any benefit that 
might derive from the competitive provision of DERs, such that winning DERs can be paid 
less than the system value of their services. It also clear that DNOs should not be allowed to 
mop all of the remaining cost savings arising from DERs provided that do not accrue to the 
DER owners, e.g., in Great Britain via regulatory incentive payments under the current net-
work price control methodology, RIIO. Thus, the interaction between the regulatory encour-
agement to save conventional system costs, to promote innovation and to satisfy the desires of 
DER stakeholders should not give rise to higher payments for existing final customers whose 
behavior does not change.
There is a need to recognize that getting the regulation of network charges right does not 
ensure that they will be reflected in retail tariffs and some interventions seem likely to prevent 
retail tariffs which exploit behavioral traits of consumers—such as customer inertia, vulnerabil-
ity or lack of cognitive capacity. Indeed, regulators seem likely to want to continue to impose 
tariffs where poorer customers ARE actively cross-subsidized by rich ones as currently happens 
with low user tariffs.
Finally, it is worth saying that it should not be up to the regulator to ‘design’ optimal tariffs 
or to necessarily find a way to make new DER business models viable. Rather it is up to new 
energy service providers using DERs to prove that they are providing aggregate system benefits 
and hence negotiate reasonable distribution tariffs with distribution entities and/or propose 
reasonable tariffs to the regulator. 
f 5. CONCLUSIONS AND OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY OPTIONS g
We discussed some of the principles, problems, and solutions behind the impact of DERs 
on electricity distribution networking charging. The principles of how to charge for electricity 
networks are complicated. We have discussed how there are several different models on which 
network charges could be based. The bottom line is that individually and collectively they do 
not offer clear guidance as to how best for a given regulator to set distribution network charges 
for households and other small users. This because of both fairness and non-obvious efficiency 
considerations.
Any charging methodology for an electricity network has to deal with the issue of fixed 
cost recovery. This is effectively a tax, which needs to be levied on network users. The tax rate 
on an individual network user could be higher or lower, but network fixed costs need to be re-
covered in aggregate, and this will lead to some clear incentives on heavily taxed users to make 
investments driven by tax avoidance advantages. 
The tariff methodology problem (as opposed to the average price or return problem) is be-
coming more significant with the increasing emergence of DERs on the electricity system. This 
is a material issue in mature networks which are not growing and where the tariff methodology 
30. See AEMC (2017) and CSIRO (2017).
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could easily produce much larger annual fluctuations in individual customer costs than the 
average uplift in costs (due to total cost changes).
Solutions do exist in how to respond to DER uptake. These are likely to include some 
combination of export and/or import charges for network use (by KW or kWh), peak kW 
export and/or import capacity available, higher reconnection charges where disconnection is a 
genuine option and charges for new services such as fast charging or connection as an ancillary 
services provider. Modelling of the impact of the likely impact of PV, EVs and distributed elec-
trical energy storage on who pays for the network under different charging methodologies will 
help the regulator anticipate what methodologies might make a difference and extent to which 
significant changes are necessary. In the short run, high uptake of PV in urban areas would 
suggest a move to either export use charges or kW peak use charges to prevent the Queensland 
situation emerging. 
There will be lots of scope for learning from relevant experiences elsewhere. However, reg-
ulators will have to pay due attention to their own statutory duties with respect to efficiency, 
equity and the promotion of innovation and competition. Different regulators will likely place 
different emphasis on each of these, with very different implications for acceptable charging 
methodologies.
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